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Swift Neighbors and Persistent Strangers: A
Cross-Cultural Investigation of Trust and
Reciprocity in Social Exchange1
Nancy R. Buchan
University of Wisconsin, Madison
Rachel T. A. Croson
University of Pennsylvania
Robyn M. Dawes
Carnegie Mellon University
In four countries, levels of trust and reciprocity in direct-reciprocal
exchange are compared with those in network-generalized exchanges
among experimentally manipulated groups’ members (neighbors) or
random experimental participants (strangers). Results show that co-
operation decreases as social distance increases; and, that identical
network-generalized exchanges generate different amounts of trusting
behavior due solely to manipulated social identity between the actors.
This study demonstrates the interaction of culture and social identity
on the propensity to trust and reciprocate and also reveals differing
relationships between trust and reciprocation in each of the four coun-
tries, bringing into question the theoretical relationship between these
cooperative behaviors.
In a recent issue of Science, biologists hailed trust and reciprocity as the
“basis of all human systems of morality” (Nowak and Sigmund 2000).
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assistance with this research. The second author’s research was supported by the
National Science Foundation (SES# 98-76079-001). We also thank several AJS re-
viewers for their helpful comments. Direct correspondence to Nancy R. Buchan, School
of Business, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin 53706.
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Indeed, the growing literature on trust across academic fields focuses on
its centrality to every area of our lives. Sociologists and psychologists
maintain that trust plays a prominent role in the emergence of cooperation
in social dilemmas (Dawes 1980; Messick and Brewer 1983; Coleman
1990) and serves to increase the potential of a system for complexity,
allowing agency relationships, for example, to emerge (Shapiro 1987).
Political scientists have shown that the level of trust in a society influences
governmental efficiency (Putnam 1993). Economists demonstrated that a
rise in country-level trust increases national economic growth (Knack and
Keefer 1997). Finally, Alan Greenspan underscored the critical nature of
trust to our economic way of life, “Trust is at the root of any economic
system based on mutually beneficial exchange . . . if a significant number
of people violated the trust upon which our interactions are based, our
economy would be swamped into immobility” (1999).
Trust figures so prominently in myriad social and economic interactions
because many of these exchanges resemble “social traps,” situations in
which a behavior that yields immediate individual advantage leads to
negative long-term consequences for the self or others (Platt 1973; Messick
and Brewer 1983). Hardin’s “tragedy of the commons” (1968) is a classic
example of this, and Coleman’s description of social exchanges, where
there is an unavoidable time lag between promise and delivery, demon-
strates where a trap might arise (1990). In such a situation, for instance,
the “quality of goods or services exchanged may turn out to be less than
expected after it is too late to recover” (Macy and Skvoretz 1998, p. 638).
If trust is not present in these social traps, exchange is unlikely to occur.
A number of formal and informal mechanisms come into play in these
exchanges to temper individual pursuit. Many are jointly negotiated and
involve some sort of institutional control, a contract, for example, to serve
as protection against exploitative behavior (Hechter 1987). Other trans-
actions occur under the specter of less-formal controls—for example, the
“shadow of the future” (Axelrod 1984)—where the threat of retaliation or
loss of reputation may be enough to prompt reciprocation.
Yet there are other exchanges that occur anonymously and in isola-
tion—in the absence of such controls, or of the prospect of repeated in-
teraction. Macy and Skvoretz explain, “There is no tougher test of the
possibility of cooperation between self-interested actors, or more generally,
of self-interest as the basis of social order. . . . The problem of transient
and anonymous exchange is not only a matter of considerable practical
interest; it is also one of the most theoretically compelling social traps.
While the incidence of cheating may be higher between strangers than
between neighbors, it is obviously not universal. Not all strangers are
dishonest, nor are all cultures reluctant to do business with ‘outsiders.’
Why not?” (1998, p. 639).
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Prompted by this question from Macy and Skvoretz, in this research
we explore anonymous, one-shot exchanges among “neighbors” and
among “strangers” in four countries. Specifically, we push the boundaries
of self-interest in an experimental game in which participants may choose
to make a risky investment. If an actor chooses to demonstrate trust and
make the investment, the target of any potential reciprocation is either
the participant himself, a “neighbor” in an experimentally manipulated
group, or a “stranger” who is randomly chosen. We examine the influence
that cultural orientation—collectivist or individualist—exerts on partici-
pants’ reluctance “to do business,” as the context of the exchange moves
from the dyad, to the group, to strangers.
To study these boundaries, we employ and extend the experimental
investment game devised by Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995). The
original game represents a one-shot scenario of reciprocal direct exchange
(Emerson 1981). (Fig. 1 depicts the basic structure of the direct exchange).
In the investment game, two actors—the sender and the responder—are
each given an endowment, say $10. The sender is told he can send some,
all, or none of his endowment to his anonymous partner, the responder.
Any money sent is tripled. The responder then chooses how much of her
total wealth (her endowment plus the tripled money for a maximum of
$40) to return to the sender. She is facing what economists call a dictator
game (Forsythe et al. 1994). Any money the responder does not return is
hers to keep; she has full control over the pool of money now in front of
her. The unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for this game is for
the responder to return no money, and thus for the sender to send none.2
In our experiment, this models direct reciprocal exchange, and we label
this the “direct condition.”
In sending money, the sender is demonstrating trust. We apply the
behavioral definition used in Kollock’s investigation of trust (1994), based
on the work of Zand (1972) and Deutsch (1962). “An action demonstrates
trust if it increases one’s vulnerability . . . to another whose behavior is
not under one’s control. It refers to the conscious regulation of one’s
dependence on another” (p. 319). In the exchanges in our experiment, an
actor who sends money is increasing his vulnerability to another (the
responder) whose behavior is not under his control.
In returning money, the responder is demonstrating reciprocity. The
responder may follow a policy of “strict reciprocity,” of responding im-
2 To understand the equilibrium, consider the responder’s decision in the second stage
of the investment game. The responder is to decide how much he wishes to return to
the sender, knowing that once his decision is made and any money returned, the game
concludes and the sender has no recourse. In such a setting, the responder will likely
return no money. Knowing this, in the first state of the investment game, the sender
will not send any money.
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Fig. 1.—Direct reciprocal exchange
mediately and in kind to a partner’s behavior (Axelrod 1984). However,
following Kollock (1993), given the continuous decision involved in our
experiment (i.e., senders or responders may send any amount of money,
as compared to the discrete cooperate or defect options seen in prisoners
dilemmas), we allow for “relaxed reciprocity” in which any amount re-
turned to the sender is labeled an act of reciprocity. We believe that both
the trusting and reciprocal behaviors in this experiment demonstrate forms
of cooperative relations, defined by Deutsch as “those in which the goals
of the parties involved are predominantly positively interdependent”
(2000, p. 25).
To test the boundaries of self-interest, and to look at its relationship to
trust and reciprocity, we extend the original investment game by adding
two conditions to examine different types of indirect exchange (Molm and
Cook 1995). Specifically, we manipulate the social context of exchange
within the network-generalized exchange structure (Yamagishi and Cook
1993) depicted in figure 2. In the group condition, the target of potential
reciprocation is someone in the sender’s (experimentally manipulated)
group. The sender likewise is a beneficiary of the potential trust and
reciprocation of other members of this “group.” In the strangers condition,
the target of potential reciprocation is a random participant in the ex-
periment. The sender, likewise, is a beneficiary of the potential trust and
reciprocation of another “stranger” in the experiment. The two exchanges
are identical in terms of structure and incentives. The sole difference
between the two is the presence of experimentally manipulated group
identity in the group condition. In both indirect conditions, the equilibrium
remains for the responder to return no money and for the sender to send
none.
The group and strangers conditions of our experiment build on the
generalized exchange research of Yamagishi and Cook (1993). As in the
network-generalized exchange structures in Yamagishi and Cook’s ex-
periments, in the group and strangers conditions of our experiment, each
actor gives to and receives from particular individuals rather than to or
from the group as a whole (as would be the case in group-generalized
exchange). Furthermore, our games are similarly characterized by a net-
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Fig. 2.—Indirect generalized exchange
work of “weak ties” (Granovetter 1973), or unidirectional flows of infor-
mation, rather than by bidirectional flows.3
One fundamental difference between our work and that of Yamagishi
and Cook (1993) is in the incentive structure of our networks. First, all
four players in the network structure examined in Yamagishi and Cook
(1993) faced an incentive structure resembling an n-person assurance game
(Sen 1967). In the assurance game, if I am assured that the other members
will cooperate, it is in my best interest to cooperate as well.4 In our
experiment, only the sender’s behavior is characterized by the assurance-
game incentive structure. If the sender believes others in the experiment
will cooperate, it is in her best interest to send money; in doing so, value
is created for the network, some of which she will capture when the
responder reciprocates.
However, the responder is not facing an assurance game, nor is he
creating value by his actions, as is the case in a more general social
dilemma (Dawes 1980). Rather, the responder, if he chooses to reciprocate,
is simply making a transfer from himself to either his own sender (in the
direct-exchange treatment), to another sender in his group, or to a stranger.
No value is created by this reciprocal action (the money is not multiplied
from the responder to the sender); it is simply an opportunity to redis-
tribute the gains from trade previously created by the sender. Thus, when
3 Our exchange structure could be likened to the chain-form of generalized exchange
discussed by Bearman (1997). However, the key to that structure is that “all values
have to flow through all parties in a cycle before a giver can become a taker, that is,
receive a gift in return” (pp. 1389). In our exchange, the values do not flow through
all parties, but through pairs in a four-actor structure.
4 This is in contrast to the n-person prisoner’s dilemma, where if I believe my partners
will cooperate, my payoff is maximized if I defect.
Trust and Reciprocity
173
others cooperate, it is not in the responder’s best interest to cooperate in
turn.
A second fundamental difference in our experiment, and the place
where we hope to extend the work of Yamagishi and Cook (1993), is in
manipulating the beneficiaries of trust and reciprocation in the network.
In doing so, we are addressing what they saw as a need for more com-
parison of various forms of generalized exchange networks to investigate
their implications for the promotion of cooperation and trust. The results
of Yamagishi and Cook (1993) demonstrated that “the social structure of
some networks . . . may make cooperation more likely than in other groups
of equivalent size” (p. 246). Our results, using a different network-
generalized structure than they used, support this as well. In our exper-
iment, two network-generalized exchanges having identical structures and
incentives generate different amounts of trusting and reciprocal behavior
solely due to manipulated social identity between actors.
In addition to gaining a better understanding of the influence of social
structure on cooperation in network-generalized exchange, we also hope
to gain an understanding of the influence of culture on the differential
treatment of strangers and neighbors, as suggested by Macy and Skvoretz.
We demonstrate that cultural orientation significantly influences the ease
with which people form groups among experimental strangers and like-
wise influences the trust and reciprocation extended to these groups.
Finally, we run the experiment in four countries in order to add ro-
bustness to our measurement of collectivistic or individualistic culture
tendencies. Given the recent proliferation of research discussing the im-
portance of trust to national wealth, economic growth, and governmental
efficiency (e.g., Fukuyama 1995; Knack and Keefer 1997; Putnam 1993),
demonstrating and explaining how trusting behavior varies from country
to country would obviously be of great importance. Yet, upon analyzing
the existing nation-based theories of trust, we find that the hypothesized
national rankings of trust suggested by these theories contrast with one
another, leaving little consensus. Therefore, we regard the national char-
acter of this research (as opposed to the cultural one) as exploratory in
nature—deepening our understanding of the differences in cooperative
behavior that may occur across countries. In doing so, we find that the
national results yield interesting theoretical insight into the relationship
between trust and reciprocation within each country in the context of
one-shot social exchange.
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THE SELF, STRANGERS, AND NEIGHBORS IN SOCIAL EXCHANGE
Private as well as societal wealth is lost each time an opportunity for pro-
ductive relationships among society’s members is not realized. (Orbell, Zeng,
and Mulford 1996, pp. 1030)
Why do exchanges occur at all, and why do some produce more value
for participants than others? In this research, we investigate these ques-
tions by comparing levels of trusting and reciprocal behavior in different
social exchanges, generating four hypotheses. First, we compare levels of
cooperation produced in direct versus indirect exchanges (hypotheses 1
and 2). Next, we compare behavior in the indirect exchanges occurring
among “neighbors” versus that occurring among “strangers” (hypothesis
3). Finally, we examine how much value is produced across the three
types of exchanges and how that value is distributed among the actors
in the exchange (hypothesis 4).
First, why would an actor demonstrate trust in a direct-reciprocal
exchange, especially given that the structure of such exchange “is inher-
ently fragile because of the potential for actors to receive value without
reciprocation” (Molm and Cook 1995)? Furthermore, in the direct con-
dition, as in all conditions in this experiment, the type of trust being
demonstrated is “depersonalized trust” (Brewer 1981). That is, these are
one-shot, anonymous exchanges in which the participant must respond
without any knowledge of the identity of the other exchange participants
or of their cooperative tendencies (as might be revealed over a sequence
of exchanges; Messick and Brewer 1983). Finally, these exchanges are
occurring in the absence of specific information about the part-
ner—“telltale signs of character” (Frank 1988) or “translucent” clues as
to the intentions of the partner (Orbell and Dawes 1991)—that would
suggest whether extending trust in the exchange is the prudent course of
action.
We believe the primary explanation for trusting behavior in direct
exchange lies in the rational choice/game theoretic framework (for reviews
of this framework, see Dawes [1980], Messick and Brewer [1983], and
Yamagishi [1995]). People may be extending trust instrumentally in order
to gain other benefits (Takahashi 2000); trusting behavior is based on self-
interested expectations of reciprocation (Williamson 1993).
What happens then to trusting behavior as we move from direct to
indirect exchange? In direct exchange, the trusting actor is also the ben-
eficiary of any potential reciprocation. In the indirect conditions in this
research, the trusting actor is not the beneficiary of direct reciprocation,
but rather any reciprocated amounts will go to someone in the trusters
“group” or to a “stranger.” Following the logic of rational choice, if the
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chance of receiving direct reciprocation is absent, the motivation to trust
is decreased in indirect exchange.
Hypothesis 1.—Trusting behavior will be lower in the indirect-
exchange conditions than in the direct-exchange condition.
What happens to reciprocal behavior as we move from direct to indirect
exchange? Three arguments predict there will be no differences between
the direct-exchange and indirect-exchange treatments. A first explanation
is the principle of reciprocity. Once an actor takes resources, he is obligated
to return them to someone else in the future (Takahashi 2000; Bearman
1997). In fact, Bearman (1997) states “both generalized and restricted
(direct) exchange rest on a norm of reciprocity” (p. 1390). This explanation
suggests that the norm of reciprocity should not be sensitive to whether
any value is returned directly to the sender or whether it is returned to
someone else.
A second explanation is suggested by what Yamagishi and Cook (1993)
have termed the “diffusion of responsibility.” Yamagishi and Cook pro-
posed that cooperation is higher in network-generalized exchange (where
actor A gives to B who gives to C, and so on) than in group-generalized
exchange (where all actors can contribute to and then take from the
resource pool), because in the group-generalized exchange structure, par-
ticipants “will believe that their actions affect each of the other partici-
pants less seriously than in the network-generalized exchange structure.
. . . Participants will feel less responsible for the benefits that each of the
other participants receives” (1993, p. 240). In our direct and indirect con-
ditions, the “diffusion of responsibility” is consistent; in all conditions, a
participant receives value from an individual and then passes that value
on to an individual. Therefore, we expect reciprocation to be constant
across all conditions.
The third explanation builds on the previous two. Snijders and Keren
(1999) conducted a set of trust experiments to test the proposition that
responders reward senders for having taken a risk and entrusting them.
They compared reciprocal behavior in an “extensive form” trust game
where the sequentiality of the game was explicit (i.e., responder B knew
that sender A had entrusted him), with behavior in a “normal form” game
in which such sequentiality was not salient. The authors found no dif-
ference in reciprocal behavior across the two conditions; responders were
not giving greater rewards to specific senders for their trust. These results
support the explanation of generalized reciprocity and suggest, like Ya-
magishi and Cook, that reciprocal behavior will be consistent across our
experimental conditions, regardless of the identities of the senders and
the potential recipients of reciprocation.
Hypothesis 2a.—Based on the explanations of reciprocity and diffu-
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sion of responsibility, we expect reciprocal behavior to be invariant across
direct and indirect exchanges.
Two other explanations suggest there will be a difference in reciprocity
between the direct and indirect exchanges. The first suggests that recip-
rocation or retribution is based on a desire to reward or punish a partner
(Molm 1988; Fehr, Gachter, and Kirchsteiger 1997). This explanation sug-
gests that reciprocation is directly correlated with amounts sent. Fur-
thermore, when moving from direct to indirect conditions, we expect
reciprocation to diminish as the ability to reward or punish a trusting or
nontrusting partner is removed.
A second explanation preserves the character of Yamagishi and Cook’s
“diffusion of responsibility” (1993) but refers instead to the target of re-
ciprocation’s state of knowledge about the responder’s decision. We term
this consideration the “ambiguity of responsibility.” Experimental evi-
dence from economics suggests that the actor’s feeling of responsibility is
sensitive to whether the actor believes the responsibility can be fully
attributed to him. In these experiments, participants making decisions
about how to distribute a pie between themselves and another participant
offered less in conditions where the size of the pie was unknown to the
other participant, but offered more when the size of the pie was common
knowledge (Croson 1996; Kagel, Kim, and Moser 1996). This difference
is attributed to fairness concerns that become relevant when the size of
the pie is known by all parties.
We believe this influence of asymmetric information could be at work
in our experiments as well. In the direct condition, the responder knows
that the sender is aware of the value of the exchange (i.e., the size of the
pie the responder now can split). In the indirect conditions, by contrast,
the responder knows that the potential recipient of reciprocation, whether
a member of his group or a stranger, does not know the total value of
the exchange (i.e., does not know how much the original sender sent to
create the pie). Therefore, a low amount reciprocated could be attributed
to either low levels of reciprocity by the responder or to low levels of
trust extended by the original sender. It is ambiguous as to whether the
responder is not reciprocating or whether he just has a very small pie to
slice. Therefore, we expect that as responsibility becomes more ambiguous
as we move from the direct- to indirect-exchange conditions, levels of
reciprocity will decline.
Hypothesis 2b.—Based on the ability to reward or punish a partner
and on the “ambiguity of responsibility” involved, we expect reciprocal
behavior to be higher in the direct-exchange condition than in the in-
direct-exchange conditions.
Our discussion now turns to why there may be differences in trusting
and reciprocal behavior between the group and strangers’ conditions.
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There is abundant evidence to suggest that levels of cooperation are higher
among neighbors than among strangers. Economic models show that ran-
dom interactions within the entire population produce very long conver-
gence times to risk-dominant equilibria, while interactions only among
nearest neighbors dramatically shorten convergence (Ellison 1993). The
experimental simulation results of Macy and Skvoretz (1998) support this,
leading the authors to state that the “earliest trust rule is based on social
distance—trust neighbors, but not outsiders” (p. 651).
Experiments in a number of fields have employed the minimal-group
paradigm and convincingly demonstrate that even the ad hoc categori-
zation of individuals into mutually exclusive groups is sufficient to create
a bias toward one’s own group members (an ingroup bias) in intergroup
evaluations and allocations (Tajfel and Turner 1979; review articles by
Brewer [1979] and Messick and Mackie [1989]).5 We will use this minimal-
group paradigm to create neighbors, as opposed to strangers.
The catalyst for ingroup favoritism is the establishment of a sense of
group identity (Orbell, van de Kragt, and Dawes 1988; Tyler and Dawes
1993). Group identity is an underpinning to projective reasoning—for
example, I believe that if I am a cooperative person and a member of
group X, then other members of group X are likely to be cooperative
(Dawes, McTavish, and Shaklee 1977). Based on this, we might expect
trusting behavior to be evident in the presence of such reasoning. Note,
in suggesting the role of group identity here, we are not doing so to the
exclusion of the self-interest paradigm (Macy 1997) nor to the sender’s
“sense of control” (Hayashi et al. 1999). In extending trust toward a group
member, a sender could be demonstrating symbolic or expressive acts on
behalf of the group (Lawler, Thye, and Yoon 2000), or he could be sending
money because he believes that in doing so he increases the likelihood
that a group member will reciprocate. In their discussion of the synthesis
between social exchange theory and social identity theory, Lawler, Thye,
and Yoon (2000) state that “psychological group formation is a powerful
unifying force among a set of independent actors. . . . Applied to the forms
of exchange, productive exchange should be especially conducive to person
to group ties” (p. 620).
While Lawler, Thye, and Yoon are discussing the application of psy-
chological group formation to productive exchange (what we have been
referring to in this paper as group-generalized exchange) in repeated con-
5 Methods of categorization include distinguishing those who prefer Klee from those
who prefer Kandinsky (Tajfel et al. 1971); separating those who underestimate the
number of dots on a page from those who overestimate (Tajfel et al. 1971); and placing
groups of participants in separate rooms for 10 minutes prior to the intergroup allo-
cation task (Orbell, van de Kragt, and Dawes 1988).
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texts, we propose it will likely have a significant influence in one-shot
network-generalized exchanges as well. In the indirect-exchange condi-
tions of our experiment, we analyze the behavior of four-person units (two
senders and two responders). In the group-indirect condition, we employ
a minimal-group manipulation to engender a sense of group membership
among the four actors; in the strangers indirect condition, no such ma-
nipulation is implemented.
Hypothesis 3.—Based on previous research demonstrating that co-
operation is higher among “neighbors” than among “strangers,” we expect
trusting and reciprocal behavior to be greater in the group condition of
network-generalized exchange in this experiment than in the strangers
condition.
Finally we turn to the questions of how much value will be generated
in each of the three exchanges, and how will that value be distributed?
First, since the total value created in these networks is dependent solely
on the trusting behavior displayed (i.e., amounts sent by the senders), we
know that if prior hypotheses are true, the value will be greatest in the
direct-reciprocal exchange and least in the strangers condition of the net-
work-generalized exchange. Second, the distribution of the value in these
exchanges is very much dependent on the balance of power in the
exchange. The responder in all three exchanges in this research is the less
dependent/more powerful party. As discussed in the section explaining
the experiment, the responder has full control over her own endowment
plus any money sent (and subsequently tripled) by the sender—hence the
label “dictator” by economists (Forsythe et al. 1994). Based on the most
basic tenets of power in social exchange in dyads and in networks (Em-
erson 1962, 1964; Emerson and Cook 1978), we expect responders in all
three exchanges to gather a greater share of the value from these exchanges
than the sender.
Hypothesis 4.—Because of the imbalance of power in these exchanges,
responders in all three conditions will gain a larger share of the value
from the exchanges than will senders.
SWIFT NEIGHBORS AND PERSISTENT STRANGERS
Our final two hypotheses examine how the behavior hypothesized above
may be sensitive to the influences of cultural orientation (hypothesis 5)
and of country-of-origin (hypothesis 6). First, evidence from cross-cultural
research demonstrates significant differences in the process of group for-
mation across cultural types; these differences bear implications for the
behavior likely to be seen in our indirect-exchange conditions. Triandis
(1995) suggests that a strong correlation exists between cultural orientation
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and the characteristics attributed to closed (constant) membership and
open (changing membership) groups (Ziller 1965). Specifically, closed
groups, like collectively oriented individuals, tend to “show much reci-
procity and are less likely to maximize individual gains by taking ad-
vantage of other group members; but people have great difficulties be-
coming assimilated in such groups” (p. 58). Conversely, people who are
individually oriented tend to function like open groups, showing “less
reciprocity of action than in closed groups . . . they see relationships as
transitory . . . they are more creative; members can join such groups easily
and are easily assimilated” (p. 58).
The difficulty in becoming a member of a collectivist group lies in the
fact that collectivist ingroups are few, tend to be more permanent, and
are formed on the basis of shared personal characteristics (e.g., family or
clan, hometown, or shared school or company affiliation). Among indi-
vidualists, however, ingroups are more plentiful, tend to be temporary
and flexible, and are based on the common beliefs and values of group
members (Triandis et al. 1988; Triandis 1995). Triandis concludes, “the
greater the rate of change of group membership, the greater the individ-
ualism” (1995, p. 58).
Research investigating the minimal-group paradigm has been con-
ducted primarily in individualist cultures (e.g., the United States, Western
Europe, etc.; see Hofstede 1980). As discussed, the results of this research
have consistently demonstrated an ingroup bias in judgment and allo-
cation decisions.
Research in predominantly collectivist cultures has also demonstrated
a strong tendency toward ingroup bias; “collectivists are extremely sup-
portive of ingroups and in situations of conflict treat outgroups very
harshly” (Triandis 1995, p. 178). However, this research has been con-
ducted primarily among naturally occurring groups in collectivist cultures,
rather than among “minimal” groups that have been experimentally
formed for a specific and limited context.6
Differences in the process of group formation across the two cultural
types suggest that experimentally influenced group biases may not be as
evident among collectivist participants as among individualist partici-
pants. We propose that collectivist participants will exhibit the same
amount of trusting and reciprocal behavior whether they are involved in
6 An example of an exception to this is Yamagishi, Cook, and Watabe (1998), who
used artificially created groups to study the free rider problem in Japan and the United
States. They suggest that the Japanese participants in their experiment did not act as
typical collectivists toward group members because an important element of collective
culture did not exist among the artificially created groups (i.e., the group lacked op-
portunities for mutual monitoring or sanctioning of each others’ behavior that might
be present in long-term ongoing relationships).
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indirect exchange with experimentally manipulated “neighbors” or
“strangers”; experimentally constructed groups are unlikely to foster a
perception of a “closed group” for the collectively oriented participant.
Individualist participants, on the other hand, will more readily identify
and assimilate with their newly formed “neighbors” and will be more
cooperative in the group condition than in the strangers condition.
Hypothesis 5.—Based on cultural differences in establishing and de-
fining groups, we expect participants who are relatively more individually
oriented to extend greater cooperation in the group indirect exchange than
in the strangers indirect exchange. Participants who are relatively more
collectively oriented will exhibit constant levels of cooperation across both
indirect exchanges.
NATIONAL DIFFERENCES IN TRUST
How might trust in social exchange differ across countries? Theories of
why people from one country may be more trusting than those from
another country come from a variety of sources across a number of ac-
ademic disciplines. Some researchers are more scientific in their ap-
proach—with a precise definition and measure of trust and results based
on empirical data—others present propositions grounded in theory from
disciplines such as cross-cultural psychology, and still others present ar-
guments that are less well supported, but highly provocative. Virtually
all of the studies examine trust at a general level, and many use as their
measure of trust the question from the World Values Survey “Generally
speaking would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t
be too careful in dealing with people?” (Inglehart, Basa´n˜ez, and Moreno
1998b).
Table 1 presents a summary of existing research concerning the influ-
ence of nationality on trust. Where possible, we also provide the predic-
tions for the current research suggested by these earlier studies.
Together, this previous research provides a varied set of testable pre-
dictions of national or institutional-based differences in trust. Indeed, too
many differing predictions result. The studies present numerous expla-
nations for differing levels of trust across countries, including the type of
culture (Fukuyama 1995) or religion (LaPorta et al. 1997) in a country,
the ease of two-way communication within the country (Fishman and
Khana 1999), the presence of monitoring or sanctioning mechanisms in
a society (Yamagishi 1988b; Hagen and Choe 1998), and the degree and
type of associativeness in a society (Putnam 1993). From these studies
emerge seven different rankings in general “trustingness” among the coun-
tries we examine: China, Japan, South Korea, and the United States.
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Acknowledging the statistical limitations of simultaneously testing mul-
tiple theories, we propose a general hypothesis:
Hypothesis 6.—Levels of trusting and reciprocal behavior displayed
will vary across the four countries studied.
We believe our contribution to this discussion will be to add greater
understanding of both trusting and reciprocal behaviors across countries
in three specific instances of social exchange. Therefore, although we do
not make any hypotheses regarding national differences in reciprocal be-
havior (since to our knowledge none have been proposed), we also will
be testing for national differences in our model of reciprocity and ex-
amining the relationship between trusting and reciprocal behavior in each
country.
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND PROCEDURES
In this section, we describe the experimental design and procedures we
use to test the hypotheses above. We also explain the controls taken to
ensure equivalence in experimental procedure across countries.
Experimental Design
A total of 548 individuals participated in this experiment: 128 students
from the University of International Business and Economics in Beijing,
China; 140 students from the University of Korea in Seoul; 140 students
from Osaka University in Japan; and 140 students from the University
of Wisconsin—Madison in the United States. Participants were primarily
sophomore or junior students in economics or business classes who were
paid their actual monetary earnings from the experiment.
In each country, we ran three sessions of the experiment, one for each
condition. Participants signed up for a session without knowledge of any
differentiation in experimental conditions. Once arriving at the experi-
ment, participants were randomly assigned to one of two rooms—the
sender room or the responder room.
Experimental Procedure
The basic procedure for the investment game is as follows. Participants
in each room received written instructions for the game, including a di-
agram of the game structure (figures 3, 4, and 5 below) and a unique
subject ID number. The instructions also included a quiz concerning the
experimental procedure and the transactions involved, to make certain
that all participants understood the task. (All experimental instructions
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TABLE 1
National Differences in Trust
Author
Central
Proposition Definition of Trust
Evidentiary
Base
Ouchi 1981 Nature of Japanese manage-
ment explains why they
were succeeding economi-
cally where Americans
were not.
None provided Anecdotal evidence, several
case studies of Japanese
and American companies
Yamagishi
et al.
1988a,
1988b,
1994,
1998
What has been claimed to
be higher levels of trust
in Japan vs. the United
States is actually a higher
level of assurance about
another’s actions.
“An expectation of goodwill
and benign intent” (1994,
p. 131)
Surveys and collective ac-
tion experiments. Depen-
dent variable p trust; ex-
planatory variables p
reputation, uncertainty,
likely use of sanctions
Hagen and
Choe
1998
Rather than viewing trust
as an inherent force in
Japanese interfirm rela-
tions, institutional and so-
cietal sanctioning mecha-
nisms are responsible for
cooperation.
“The expectation that the
promise of another can be
relied on and that, in un-
foreseen circumstances, the
other will act in a spirit of
cooperation with the trus-
tor” (p. 590)
A detailed account of the
nature and social context
of buyer-seller relation-
ships in Japan
Fukuyama
1995
Trust is a function of cul-
ture and varies greatly
from one society to an-
other, thus contributing to
differences in the eco-
nomic prosperity of
nations.
“The expectation that arises
within a community of
regular, honest, and coop-
erative behavior, based on
commonly shared norms,
on the part of other mem-
bers of the community”
(p. 26)
Historical and cultural argu-
ments demonstrate the
level of trust in a society
Putnam
1993
Institutional stability and
economic prosperity are a
function of the level of
social capital (defined as
trust, norms of reciproc-
ity, and associative net-
works) in society.
“You do not trust a person to
do something merely be-
cause he says he will do it.
You trust him only be-
cause, knowing what you
know of his disposition, his
available options and their
consequences, his ability
and so forth you expect
that he will choose to do
it” (p. 171).
20-year, multimethod analy-
sis of the disparity in eco-
nomic growth and gov-
ernment stability across
regions of Italy; variables
examined p measures of
institutional performance,
trust, cooperation, satis-
faction, civic involvement
LaPorta et
al. 1997
Trust enhances economic
performance across coun-
tries. There is a strong
negative correlation be-
tween hierarchical reli-
gions and trust and eco-
nomic performance.
None provided Two analyses on data from
40 countries: regress eco-
nomic performance mea-
sures on trust and %pop-
ulation belonging to a
hierarchical religion, and
correlate trust with the
religion
Fishman
and
Khanna
1999
Trust is not a purely cul-
tural or historic residue,
but can be attributed to
the ease of two-way com-
munication in a society.
“When we say we trust
someone or that someone
is trustworthy, we implic-
itly mean that the proba-
bility that he will perform
an action that is beneficial
is high enough for us to
consider engaging in some
form of cooperation with
him” (p. 80).k
Regress level of trust in 40
countries on the number
of phones per capita,
GDP per capita, %popu-
lation belonging to hierar-
chical religion, level of
urbanization
* We made this hypothesis for our research because our experiment does not include any sanctioning
mechanism, thus, the constraint on Japanese opportunism is absent.
† Fukuyama argues that large-scale businesses emerge in low-trust familistic societies, such as Korea,
only when the state creates such corporations through subsidies, guidance, or outright ownership (1995,
p. 30).
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Measure of Trust Used Summary of Main Arguments/Findings
Trust Prediction for
Current Research
None provided Close relationships between employees and man-
agement in Japanese companies creates trust
that facilitates more efficient and collectively
minded decision making and eases network
realtionships.
Japan 1 United
States
A six-item general trust scale;
items include “Most people
are basically trustworthy”
Americans display more generalized trust (toward
everyone including strangers). Japanese display
more trust toward ingroup members because of
greater assurance of their actions, as a result of
a system of mutual monitoring and sanctioning
within that society.
United States 1
Japan*
None provided Identifies several institutional mechanisms (such
as subcontractor grading, and a dual-vendor
policy) and societal sanctioning mechanisms
(such as ostracism) that promote cooperation
in the buyer- seller relationship.
United States 1
Japan*
None provided A correlation exists between trust and the size of a
country’s corporations. The low levels of trust
extended outside family circles in China and
Korea, e.g., inhibit the hiring of nonkin profes-
sional managers, and limit the growth of corpo-
rations.† High levels of trust in the United
States and Japan are demonstrated by the huge
scale of non-family-run corporations.
United States and
Japan 1 S. Korea
and China
“Some people say that you usu-
ally can trust people. Others
say that you must be very
wary in your relations with
people. What is your view?”
(p. 112). (Likert scaled
response).
A high degree of civic involvement in society in-
creases trust and thus social capital. Stocks of
social capital are self-reinforcing and cumula-
tive. High levels of social capital correlate
with the most economically prosperous and in-
stitutionally stable regions of Italy.
United States 1 S.
Korea 1 China 1
Japan‡
From the World Values Survey
(Inglehart et al.1998a):
“Would you say that most
people can be trusted or that
you can’t be too careful in
dealing with people?” (Likert
scaled response).
The correlation between trust and membership
in hierarchical religion is . Holding per0.61
capita income constant, countries with more
dominant hierarchical religions exhibit lower
performance on a number of economic
dimensions.
China p Japan 1
S. Korea 1
United States§
From the World Values Survey The number of phones per capita exerts a strong
positive influence on the level of trust in a so-
ciety. The urbanization phone interaction also
is significant, the link between income and
trust is positive but weak, and %hierarchical
religion partially mediates the influence of the
number of phones on trust.
United States 1 Ja-
pan 1 S. Korea 1
China§
‡ According to data from the World Fact Book (1999), the number of association memberships/capita
is the following; China p .73, United States p 1.81, South Korea p 1.34, Japan p .45
§ According to data from the World Fact Book (1999), the %population belonging to a hierarchical
religion is China p 1%, Japan p 1%, Korea p 10%, United States p 28%.
k This definition is taken from Gambetta (1988).
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are available from the authors upon request.) Once participants completed
the quiz correctly, they were given a numbered envelope containing the
experimental money ($10 in the United States and equivalent amounts in
other countries). The number on the envelope represented the subject’s
own identification number.
Senders removed their money from the envelope and replaced in the
same envelope any money they wished to send to the responder. Monitors
collected the envelopes and took them to the experimenter in a different
room who recorded the amount sent, tripled it, and placed the tripled
money into different numbered envelopes for delivery by another monitor
to the appropriate responder. Notice that this implements a double-blind
procedure (Hoffman et al. 1996). The monitor who saw the participant
did not know the amount they sent, while the experimenter, who saw the
amount sent, did not know the participant. The participants, of course,
did not know the identity of their partner. Our experiment was run double-
blind to prevent self-presentation (face-saving) effects, which may be par-
ticularly prevalent among Asian participants (Bond and Hwang 1995).
The responders then opened their envelopes and decided how much
money to return to the appropriate responder from their own experimental
money and the (tripled) money they had received. They placed that
amount back into their own envelopes. Monitors collected the envelopes
from the responders and gave them to the experimenter who recorded
the amounts returned, placed the money back into the senders’ original
envelopes, and forwarded the envelopes into the senders’ room for dis-
tribution by the monitors. At this point, the experiment ended. Partici-
pants completed a postexperimental questionnaire, were paid their earn-
ings privately, and were dismissed.
Direct Condition
The direct condition is depicted in figure 3. This is the most basic condition
in the experiment, identical to that of Berg et al. (1995), in which sender
A sends some, all, or none of his money to responder B. On the way from
sender A to responder B, the money is tripled by the experimenter. Re-
sponder B then has her own experimental money plus triple the money
sent by A and can return some, all, or none of her total wealth to A.
Aside from explaining the experimental procedure and depicting it on the
diagram given to participants, the wording on the instructions specific to
this condition is “You will interact with a responder (sender) for purposes
of this experiment.”
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Fig. 3.—Direct condition
Group Condition
The group condition is depicted in figure 4. In this condition, sender A
sends money (which is tripled by the experimenter) to responder B. At
the same time, sender C sends money (which is tripled by the experi-
menter) to responder D. Responder B then returns some proportion of
her wealth to sender C, while responder D returns some proportion of
his wealth to sender A. Aside from explaining the experimental procedure
and depicting it on the diagram given to participants, the wording on the
instructions specific to this condition is “You will interact with three other
people for purposes of this experiment.” As an additional reinforcement
of group identity, each group was given differently colored instruc-
tions—thus implementing a standard minimal-group manipulation.
Strangers Condition
The strangers condition is shown in figure 5. In this condition, sender A
sends money (which is tripled by the experimenter) to responder B. At
the same time, responder D receives money from a different, randomly
chosen, sender in sender A’s room. Responder D then returns some pro-
portion of his wealth to sender A, while responder B returns some pro-
portion of her wealth to a randomly chosen sender in sender A’s room.
Aside from explaining the experimental procedure and depicting it on the
diagram given to participants, the wording on the instructions specific to
this condition is “You will interact with two responders (senders) for
purposes of this experiment.”
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Fig. 4.—Group condition
Cross-Country Controls
The international character of this research warranted that we control
for country or culture-specific variables that could influence our results.
Specifically, we addressed the following issues, as suggested by Roth et
al. (1991) in their multiple-country investigation of behavior in economic
games.
Controlling for subject pool equivalency.—We controlled for equiva-
lency in educational background and knowledge of economics among the
subject populations in three ways: First, the universities chosen for the
experiment were all well-known universities in their countries. Second,
participants were all sophomore or junior economics or business under-
graduate students and were paid their earnings in the experiment. Third,
participants were questioned about their level of exposure to economic
theory and to game theory in particular. Answers to these questions are
entered as covariates in the final analysis of results.
Controlling for currency effects.—We controlled for purchasing power
parity by choosing denominations such that monetary incentives relative
to subject income and living standards were approximately equal across
countries (as in Kachelmeier and Shehata [1992]). Amounts used were
Japan (¥2,000), Korea (1,000 won), China (10 yuan), United States ($10
dollar). These amounts were based on information from U.S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics (U.S. Department of Labor 1998) and on the recommen-
dations of three independent experts on each economy.
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Fig. 5.—Strangers condition
Controlling for language effects.—To control for any nuances in lan-
guage that may influence results across countries, instructions for the
experiments in China, Japan, and Korea were translated into the native
language and back-translated into English using separate external
translators.
Controlling for experimenter effects.—Various measures were taken to
control for differences among experimenters in different countries. First,
in each country, the lead experimenter was an advanced student in busi-
ness and a native of that country. Second, an extremely thorough exper-
imental protocol was designed based upon the procedure used in all four
countries. The protocol included information such as the positioning of
the experimenter in the room and the method to be used in answering
subject questions. Third, the experimenter from the United States met
with the lead experimenter in each country prior to each experiment to
brief them on the protocol and to run through a practice (no participants)
session with them. Finally, the American experimenter was present in the
data recording room while each experiment was being conducted.
Experimental Questionnaire
To assess participants’ collectivist and individualist tendencies, we em-
ployed the INDCOL scale developed by Singelis et al. (1995). Due to time
constraints during the experiment, we shortened the scale to include the
17 questions we believed were the most relevant to our task from the
American Journal of Sociology
188
total 32-item scale. Prior factor analyses have confirmed the cultural di-
mensions, with reported alpha coefficients for the scales ranging from .68
to .74.7 Questions in the scale were Likert-scaled and included ones such
as the following: “One should live one’s life independently of others,” and
“It is important for me to maintain harmony within my group.”
To assess the effectiveness of our minimal-group manipulations, we
asked participants questions concerning the actors with whom they would
be interacting. According to Brewer, intergroup similarity affects “the
probability that a respondent will be aware of a relevant basis for cate-
gorization into groups, which in turn determines the amount of ingroup
bias that is evidenced” (1979, p. 319). Therefore, to tap into participants’
perceived similarity, the basic question was, for example, “How similar
are you to Responder C? 1 p very different, 7 p very much alike.” For
the direct-exchange condition, there was a single question concerning the
participant’s counterpart. For the group indirect-exchange condition,
there were three questions concerning the other three members of the
participant’s group. For the strangers indirect-exchange condition, there
were also three questions concerning the two responders or senders with
whom the participant was matched and the other senders or responders
in their own room. (For the sake of comparability in analysis, the similarity
measures for the group and strangers conditions will be the sum of all
three similarity responses divided by three). The questionnaire containing
the INDCOL scale, the similarity measures, and other questions, such as
gender and number of economics classes taken (which will be entered
into our analyses as covariates), was administered at the end of the session
after participants completed the experimental task.
RESULTS
Analysis of Questionnaire Measures
The measures of cultural orientation analyzed with maximum likelihood
factor analysis and submitted to oblique rotation (previous research sug-
gests the cultural dimensions are not orthogonal; Singelis et al. 1995). A
two-factor structure was obtained, accounting for 12% of the variance.
7 Use of the INDCOL scale has demonstrated the emergence of four factors: horizontal
individualism, horizontal collectivism, vertical individualism, and vertical collectivism
(Singelis et al. 1995). A description of these four cultural values is discussed in Triandis
(1995). The distinctions between vertical or horizontal individualism and collectivism
do not have significant implications for predicted behavior in the exchanges studied
here, thus we have collapsed the four dimensions into their two basic forms. For a
demonstration of how all four cultural values do influence behavior in social dilemmas,
see Probst, Carnevale, and Triandis (1999).
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Based on the factor analysis, the items with factor loadings of 0.50 or
greater on each factor were selected to measure individualism and col-
lectivism, and the items (six items for collectivism and five for individ-
ualism) were summed and averaged, producing two indexes, one for each
cultural factor. The Cronbach alphas for each scale were acceptable; 0.70
for the collectivism scale and 0.67 for the individualism scale.8 A “culture”
variable was constructed for future analyses by categorizing participants
on the basis of their highest INDCOL score (e.g., Triandis and Gelfand
1998); therefore, “culture” is a 0,1 variable depending on whether the
collectivism or individualism score is highest.
Correlations were analyzed between collectivism, individualism, the
constructed culture variable, and the four nationalities as indicated by
0,1 dummy variables. The two continuous culture measures are signifi-
cantly correlated with the culture measure ( , andrp .54 P ! .01 rp
.45, , respectively). None of the nationalities are significantlyP ! .01
correlated with the constructed culture variable, thus minimizing the
multicollinearity in our models when both the culture variable and the
countries are introduced.9
The similarity measures are intended to serve as manipulation checks
on the efficacy of our minimal-group manipulation. The results of an
ANOVA on perceived similarity suggest that the manipulation was ef-
fective, and as expected, it was more effective among individualist par-
ticipants. Mean similarity ratings were 4.65 in the direct condition, 4.55
in the group condition, and 3.95 in the strangers condition; the effect is
weakly significant ( , ). The responses given by partic-F p 2.7 P ! .10(2,546)
8 The fact that we administered the scale after the experiment leaves our results vul-
nerable to the possibility that the experimental procedures themselves may have sys-
tematically influenced a preference for one cultural orientation over the other. To
investigate this possibility, we conducted a multivariate ANOVA with experimental
condition as the independent variable and the cultural measures as the dependent
variables. No effects for condition were found, , NS. This result providesF(2,548)p .23
a degree of confidence that the culture measure derived reflects an innate orientation
of participants, rather than one that was developed and shaped by experimental
procedures.
9 The correlations between culture and each of the nationalities are the following:
Chinese ( , NS); Korean ( , NS); Japanese ( , NS); Americanrp .06 rp.05 rp .02
( , NS). Our results are basically consistent with a just-published meta-analysisrp.03
of studies that have employed measures of individualism and collectivism (Oyserman,
Coon, and Kemmelmeier 2002). For example, the authors conclude, “Researchers
should not assume that all East Asians are lower in IND and higher in COL than
Americans” (p. 28), after results from the meta-analysis showed Americans to have
higher COL scores than Japanese and other Asians (with the exception of participants
from China). Additionally, Oyserman, Coon, and Kemmelmeier (2002) show that the
degree of collectivism or individualism displayed—and the correlation between the
two—depends very much on the focus of the questions used (e.g., duty to ingroup or
loyalty to ingroup).
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Fig. 6.—Perceived similarity: condition # cultural orientation; circles p individualists,
squares p collectivists.
ipants who were either relatively more collectivist or individualist are
shown in figure 6 and demonstrate the significant interaction of culture
and condition on similarity ratings ( , ). CollectivistsF p 4.80 P ! .05(2,546)
perceived the same levels of similarity across all three conditions, while
individualists perceived higher levels of similarity in the manipulated
group condition than in the strangers condition. Perceived similarity did
not significantly differ by role ( , NS); senders and respondersF p .62(1,546)
reacted in the same manner to the experimental social distance.
Experimental Results
The dependent variables in our analysis are the amount sent by the sender
to the responder and the proportion returned by the responder. We cal-
culate the proportion returned as the amount responders returned divided
by their total wealth (three times the amount the sender sent plus the
endowment). This proportion is the percentage of total wealth that re-
sponders are returning to senders in dictator fashion. For purposes of
analysis, monetary amounts across the four countries have been stan-
dardized on a scale from 0 to 1,000 units.
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Fig. 7.—Amounts sent and proportions returned across conditions; barsp amount sent,
squares p proportion returned.
Figure 7 displays the amounts sent and proportions returned across all
conditions of the experiment. Mean amounts sent are 635 in the direct
condition, 480 in the group condition, and 387 in the strangers condition.
Mean proportions returned equal 0.35 in the direct condition, 0.18 in the
group condition, and 0.14 in the strangers condition.
Table 2 shows the results from two analyses of variance. In the first
model, the dependent variable is amount sent; in the second model, the
dependent variable is proportion returned. In both analyses, the inde-
pendent variables are experimental condition, the constructed culture var-
iable, and nationality. Additionally, gender and number of economics
courses are added as covariates to each analysis, given that such char-
acteristics have been suggested as influences on trusting and reciprocal
behavior (Snijders and Keren 2001). Neither covariate, however, proved
to have a significant influence on amount sent or proportion returned.
Direct versus Indirect Exchange
We hypothesized that amounts sent will be lower in the indirect than
direct exchange conditions, because in the indirect conditions, the instru-
mentality of extending trust is missing (hypothesis 1). We proposed con-
trasting hypotheses for the influence of moving from direct to indirect
exchange on proportion returned. If the universal reciprocity argument
holds, proportions returned will be invariant across exchange conditions
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TABLE 2
Analyses of Variance
Source
Dependent Variable
Amount Sent Proportion Returned
Condition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14.38*** 12.68***
Culture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.76 4.62**
Nationality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.22*** 6.12***
Condition # culture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.12*** 3.04*
Condition # nationality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.33 .45
Nationality # culture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.11 .51
Condition # nationality # culture . . . 1.25 1.22
Gender . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.18 .35
Economics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .92 .01
N . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 273 273
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2R .25 .27
* .P ! .10
** .P ! .05
*** .P ! .01
(hypothesis 2a). If instead the reward/punishment or ambiguity of re-
sponsibility arguments are supported, proportions returned will be lower
in the indirect than direct conditions (hypothesis 2b).
Given that the overall effect of condition is significant for both amounts
sent and proportions returned (as shown in table 2), we are able to conduct
simple comparisons of the indirect versus direct conditions—collapsing
the group and strangers indirect conditions for the contrast. The results
of these simple comparisons are highly significant for amount sent
( , ), and for proportion returned ( ,F p 26.94 P ! .01 F p 22.51(1,273) (1,273)
). Thus, hypotheses 1 and 2b are supported—self-interest seeminglyP ! .01
plays a large role in trusting behavior, and reciprocal behavior seems to
be motivated by the ability to reward or punish a partner or by the degree
to which responsibility for reciprocal acts can be clearly attributed. A
generalized norm of reciprocity (which generated hypothesis 2a) is not
supported, as differing proportions of the responders’ wealth are returned,
depending on whether the reciprocation is going to the sender himself or
to someone else.
The fact that responder displayed a high level of reciprocity in the
direct generalized exchange condition, but significantly lower amounts in
both indirect conditions is also consistent with the ambiguity of respon-
sibility explanation of reciprocity. Responders reciprocated greater pro-
portions of their wealth in the direct exchange where the size of the pie
to be shared was common knowledge and responsibility for the value
reciprocated was clearly on the shoulders of the responder. Responders
reciprocated significantly less in both the indirect exchange conditions
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where the size of the pie was not common knowledge and the responsible
party for a low value reciprocated was ambiguous.
Moving from Neighbors to Strangers
We hypothesized that cooperation will be higher in the group network-
generalized condition in this experiment than in the strangers network-
generalized condition (hypothesis 3). Referring to table 2, the effect of
condition is highly significant for both amounts sent ( ,F p 14.38(2,273)
) and proportion returned ( , ). To determineP ! .01 F p 12.68 P ! .01(2,273)
whether amounts sent and proportions returned significantly differ across
the group and strangers conditions, we then conducted a Tukey HSD test
within the full ANOVA. The difference in mean amounts sent is significant
at the level; the difference in proportions returned across indirectP ! .05
conditions is not significant. Actors in this experiment were more trusting
to neighbors than to strangers but were equally reciprocal to both.
We believe this pattern of results suggests a few implications. First, the
result concerning reciprocity lends support for the “ambiguity of respon-
sibility” argument since the level of ambiguity was constant across both
indirect conditions. Second, the fact that trusting behavior was more
influenced by manipulations of social distance than was reciprocal be-
havior suggests that the influence of group membership may be most
powerful when actions are transparent. That is, actions in the interest of
the group seem more likely to occur when they will be unambiguous and
clearly seen (trusting behavior) than when they will be more ambiguous
and not clearly attributable (reciprocal behavior). Finally, the constant
level of reciprocity across the indirect conditions does demonstrate that
people tend to be trustworthy once others place their trust in them. The
amounts returned in these conditions suggest that the prominent issue for
the responder may not be social identity, but rather the morality of what
to do now that trust has been placed in her.
THE DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH
Given that trusting behavior varies significantly across the three condi-
tions, the total amount of wealth generated varies across conditions as
well. The maximum wealth in the exchange is 4,000 units; this will be
the case if the sender sends all of his 1,000 unit endowment, it is tripled,
and the responder adds her 1,000 unit endowment to the 3,000 she re-
ceives. Mean amounts of wealth to be divided in each of the conditions
are 3,271 (82% of the possible total) in the direct-exchange condition,
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2,961 (74%) in the group indirect exchange, and 2,774 (69%) in the strang-
ers indirect exchange.
Based on the balance of power in these exchanges, we hypothesized
that responders will end with a greater proportion of the value from
exchange than will senders (hypothesis 4). To test this, we conducted an
analysis of variance on final wealth with role and condition as independent
variables. While both effects were highly significant, the influence of role
was clearly dominant in the model. Our hypothesis was supported con-
cerning the balance of power; senders took home an average of 1,074
units versus 1,873 for the responders ( , ).F p 160.13 P ! .01(1,547)
To gain a deeper understanding of how the trust and reciprocation
decisions influenced the wealth of senders and responders in the experi-
ment, we graphed the joint earnings of the players across conditions in
the manner done by Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995) in figures 8, 9,
and 10. On these graphs, the large outer triangle with points {(0, 4,000),
(1,000, 1,000), and (3,000, 1,000)} indicates the set of earnings for the sender
and responder pairs in which the responder’s final earnings equal at least
her endowment. The “no payback line” indicates where k (the amount
reciprocated by the responder) p 0. The “breakeven line” represents the
break-even point for the sender, ( ), and the areakp 1/3 3# amount sent
to the right of this line indicates positive returns to the sender. The “split
total return line” denotes outcomes when the responder evenly splits the
amount she received; ( ). The “split total earningskp 1/2 3# amount sent
line” designates when the responder splits total earnings inclusive of her
experiment fee; ( ). Note that points lying belowkp 2/3 3# amount sent
the (3,000, 1,000) line represent those pairs where the responder was ex-
cessively reciprocal and returned to the sender not only the entire amount
received but also a portion of her own endowment.
A regression on the value k with condition as independent variable
indicates significant differences across conditions in the wealth distribu-
tions between the senders and the responders. A Tukey HSD test com-
paring k across conditions shows that k is significantly higher in the direct
condition than in the group or the strangers(kp .556) (kp .369) (kp
conditions . Responders are splitting the total experimental.334) (P ! .05)
earnings almost (but not quite) equally with senders in the direct condition,
but in the group and strangers conditions, senders are on average just
breaking even. Thus, in each condition, the hypothesis concerning power
is supported.
However, these results suggest that although responders may be using
their power to their advantage, they certainly are not doing so to the
fullest extent. Approximately 13% of all responders equally shared the
total exchange pie with the sender or were even more generous than an
equal split. Even in the group and strangers exchange conditions, where
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Fig. 8.—Distribution of joint earnings, direct condition
there was “ambiguous responsibility” and the responder could escape full
responsibility for her actions, responders do not seem to be getting rich
at the expense of the senders; on average, senders went home with their
original endowment.
Swift Neighbors and Persistent Strangers
We hypothesized that differences in the definition and method of group
formation would prompt differences across cultural orientations in re-
sponse to our group and strangers manipulations. The expected outcome
is that individualists, who more quickly assimilate with group members,
would extend more trust and reciprocation in the group than strangers
conditions, but that the behavior of collectivists, who tend not to form
quick and temporary groups, would not vary across the two conditions.
This hypothesis is supported as shown in table 2. The interaction of
condition and culture has a significant influence on amounts sent
( , ) and a weakly significant influence on proportionsF p 4.12 P ! .05(2,273)
returned ( , ). The influence of the interaction onF p 3.04 P ! .10(2,273)
amounts sent is graphed in figure 11. Individually oriented participants
seem to quickly embrace “neighbors”—sending relatively equal amounts
in the direct and group condition, but less in the strangers exchange,
while collectively oriented participants persist in treating all others as
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Fig. 9.—Distribution of joint earnings, group condition
“strangers”—extending more trust in the direct condition but less and
equal amounts in the group and strangers conditions.
Our results concerning the influence of condition and the condition by
culture interaction have been supported; we now turn to trying to gain
a better understanding of why. Specifically, is it social identity, as measured
here by a similarity measure, which is influencing the changes in behavior
across conditions? To test this, we conduct a mediation analysis, as pre-
scribed by Baron and Kenny (1986). First, as shown previously, our ma-
nipulation check of the minimal group manipulation demonstrated a sig-
nificant effect of condition and condition by culture on perceived
similarity. Next, the correlation between amount sent and perceived sim-
ilarity is significant ( , ). However, when perceived simi-Rp .15 P ! .01
larity is added to the model for amount sent, the influence of the condition
or condition by culture variables does not decline. Thus, we conclude,
perceived similarity is not a mediating factor on amount sent.
Although we are left without a clear explanation of the interaction
between culture and condition, the failure of perceived similarity to me-
diate the influence of condition on amount sent should not be taken as a
lack of support for theories of social identity. Rather, we suspect that the
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Fig. 10.—Distribution of joint earnings, strangers condition
single measure of perceived similarity used here may not have been broad
enough to capture the construct of social identity.10
National Differences in Trust
We hypothesized that national differences in trusting behavior would
exist. This hypothesis is supported by our data as shown in the first model
of table 2. The influence of nationality is highly significant (F p(3,273)
, ) even independent of the effect of culture; and the Tukey7.22 P ! .01
HSD test reveals that the amounts sent by American and Chinese par-
ticipants are significantly higher than amounts sent by Korean and Jap-
anese participants . Interestingly, none of the theories listed in(P ! .05)
table 1 that directly discuss or might be extrapolated to pertain to these
four countries (Fukuyama 1995; Putnam 1993; La Porta et al. 1997; Fish-
man and Khana 1999) provide the ranking of trustingness among China,
Japan, Korea, and the United States shown here. The difference in trust
extended by American and Japanese participants does, however, support
the theories of Yamagishi and colleagues (e.g., 1988a, 1988b, 1994, 1998).
10 Yamagishi, Jin, and Kiyonari (1999) present an alternative explanation. Their re-
search indicates that the effect of minimal groups is not mediated by identification;
rather, it is mediated by the expectation of generalized reciprocity. Future research
may tease out these two explanations.
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Fig. 11.—Amount sent: condition# cultural orientation; circlesp individualists, squares
p collectivists.
Americans have a higher level of general trust and are more trusting than
the Japanese in the absence of sanctioning or monitoring mechanisms to
influence cooperation.
Although we made no formal hypotheses, we tested for and demonstrate
a highly significant influence of nationality of reciprocal behavior as well
( , ). The Tukey HSD tests shows that the proportionsF p 6.12 P ! .01(3,273)
returned by Chinese and Korean participants are significantly higher than
the proportions returned by Japanese and American participants (P !
. Thus, our results suggest that norms of reciprocity, as well as norms.05)
of trust, may vary by country.
The most interesting point in these country comparisons emerges when
we compare levels of trusting and reciprocal behavior within each country.
We might expect that high levels of trust will be met with high levels of
reciprocation and that low levels of trust will be met with low levels of
reciprocation. Examination of the relationship between trust and reci-
procity across countries reveals some very different patterns (refer to
table 3). For simplicity’s sake, in this table we define trusters as those
who send at least half of their endowment. Reciprocators are defined as
Trust and Reciprocity
199
TABLE 3
Trusting and Reciprocal Behavior across Countries
Reciprocators
(Sent  Received 1 0)
Nonreciprocators
(Sent  Received ! 0)
Trusters (sent 500 or more) . . . Chinese Americans
52%/65% 60%/32%
Nontrusters (sent ! 500) . . . . . . Koreans Japanese
44%/74% 44%/34%
Note.—%sending 500 or more/%reciprocating positive amount.
those responders who divided the value of the exchange so that the senders
at least broke even (received back at least as much as was sent).
The countries that fit into the rational framework are China and Japan.
Chinese participants extend high levels of trust and also high levels of
reciprocation; Japanese participants extend low levels of trust and low
levels of reciprocation. The relationship between trust and reciprocation
becomes confusing when we move to the United States or Korea. Amer-
ican participants show high trust, but relatively low reciprocation. Korean
participants demonstrate low levels of trust, but in return receive high
levels of reciprocation.11
Given that the exchanges in this experiments were one-shot episodes,
it is possible that these patterns of trust and behavior will converge after
repeated play (Axelrod 1984). (The question of which way they would
converge, however, is open to question. Will Koreans become more trust-
ing? Will Americans become more reciprocal?) However, even in these
one-shot exchanges, the behaviors exhibited yield insight into the nature
of trust and reciprocation. Specifically, trusting and reciprocating may
be two very distinct, differently motivated—and sometimes unlinked
—cooperative behaviors.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
We began this article discussing how trust and reciprocation have been
proposed as the “basis of all human systems of morality” (Nowak and
Sigmund 2000). We investigated trusting and reciprocal behavior in anon-
ymous, isolated (one-shot) exchanges, situations that represent “no tougher
test . . . of self interest as the basis of social order” (Macy and Skvoretz
11 Yamagishi in various papers (e.g., Yamagishi, Cook, and Watabe 1998) provides an
argument that the portion of trust that is independent of surrounding people’s trust-
worthiness (in our case, the propensity to reciprocate) can be conceptualized as risk-
taking. This risk propensity may help explain the mismatch between levels of trust
and reciprocity.
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1998). Our experiment—in dyads, among group members, and in strang-
ers—demonstrates that self-interest, trust, and reciprocation are all active
in social exchange.
A boundary of self-interest seems to lie at the point where direct rec-
iprocity ends. The instrumentality of trust—the expectation of something
directly in return—is missing (or, at least, is changed in character) when
reciprocity is targeted instead to a group member or to a stranger. Not
surprising, amounts sent significantly decrease once the element of direct
instrumentality is removed. However, even in the group and strangers
exchanges, amounts sent deviate far from equilibrium predictions of no
exchange—suggesting that motivations for trust move beyond pure self-
interest. Perhaps the positive amounts sent in the group and strangers
conditions are motivated, as suggested by Sabel (1993), by trusting in a
shared sense of community with a common fate.
Reciprocity in this experiment seems to be motivated less by reciprocal
norms (which suggest that proportions returned would not be influenced
by the target of reciprocation), but instead by a motivation to reward or
punish a partner or by the ambiguity of responsibility. The finding that
levels of reciprocity decrease from the direct condition to lower and equal
levels in the indirect conditions suggests that a self-interested responder
will keep more and reciprocate less if she knows responsibility for the
amount reciprocated cannot be fully attributed to her. Yet, given the
balance of power in these exchanges, it is interesting—and downright
surprising given the economic equilibrium—that any amounts were re-
ciprocated at all. These findings agree with Rabin (1993), who suggested
that the actions of reciprocally motivated individuals produce outcomes
that differ significantly from those predicted by models of utility based
purely on self-interest.
We demonstrate significant declines in trusting behavior as the context
of the exchange moves from the group to strangers. This finding supports
the many others that have shown that levels of cooperation tend to be
higher the stronger the ties between actors in the exchange (e.g., Gra-
novetter 1973; Orbell, van de Kragt, and Dawes 1988; Macy and Skvoretz
1998). Our results are in agreement with Macy and Skvoretz’s (1998)
proposition that the first rule of trust is based on social distance. The
differential influence of manipulated social distance on trusting and re-
ciprocal behavior suggests, however, that social distance may have its
limits. The influence of group membership is likely to be stronger when
actions taken can be clearly seen and attributed (trusting behavior) than
when they cannot (reciprocal behavior).
The results of Macy and Skvoretz’s (1998) repeated simulation also
suggests that, if we were to change the character of our exchanges from
one-shot to repeated, the “parochial rules” for exchanging within the in-
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group may not survive and greater trust might spread to strangers, giving
way to universal solidarity. If this is true, our results concerning cultural
orientation and cooperative behavior suggest that the speed at which
universal solidarity will be accomplished is likely to vary across cultural
types. Participants who were relatively more individually oriented quickly
adopted the notion of the group—even an experimentally induced
one—and displayed parochialism, demonstrating higher levels of trust
toward “neighbors” than toward “strangers.” Participants who were rel-
atively more collectively oriented did not embrace the group, but instead
persisted in treating all participants in the experiment as strang-
ers—ironically suggesting a relatively longer road to embracing universal
solidarity among collectivists than among individualists.
Our national results demonstrate that American and Chinese partici-
pants were more trusting in this experiment and that Chinese and Korean
participants were more reciprocal. Narrowly interpreted, these findings
support the work of Yamagishi and colleagues (e.g., 1988a, 1988b, 1994,
1998), which suggests that levels of cooperation among Japanese partic-
ipants will be low when monitoring or sanctioning mechanisms are not
present to provide assurance of other’s cooperative behavior. More
broadly interpreted, given the multiplicity of theories concerning the link
between country of origin and trust and the contrasting hypotheses and
data that result from such research, it is clear that much yet needs to be
understood about the influence of national as well as economic, religious,
and social factors on trusting behavior.
Furthermore and perhaps more important, many of these nation-based
theories, which focus almost exclusively on trust and not on reciprocation,
seem to assume that trust and reciprocation go hand-in-hand; when trust
is extended, value is created and reciprocated, and society benefits in turn.
Our results concerning trust and reciprocation within each country dem-
onstrate that this relationship may be more complex than originally
thought. Trust and reciprocation may be delinked, arising out of differing
motivations. Further study is needed to more clearly understand the re-
lationship between these two cooperative behaviors and to be able to
assess the implications of trust on national prosperity, economic growth,
or stability (e.g., Fukuyama 1995; Knack and Keefer 1997; Putnam 1993)
when matching levels of reciprocity may not automatically be assumed.
In this experiment, we demonstrated that levels of trust declined when
the context of exchange moved from group to strangers, and consequently,
the value gained from exchange was reduced. The simulation results of
Orbell, Zeng, and Mulford (1996) suggest that fragmentation almost in-
evitably occurs in society, reducing the opportunities for creation of so-
cietal wealth. Like the distinctions made by the minimal-group manip-
ulation in our experiment, Orbell, Zeng, and Mulford show that
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fragmentation can occur even in the absence of conflicts of interest or of
“statistical” differences between categories or groups of people. Thus, Or-
bell and colleagues suggest society hangs somewhere in the balance be-
tween “full integration,” where all encounters result in productive
exchange, and a Hobbesian anomic society, in which “nobody consum-
mates play with anybody” (p. 1020).
The introduction of group and stranger distinctions in our experiment
influenced the levels of cooperation extended and pulled our results away
from a situation of full integration. Nonetheless, the levels of cooperation
displayed in these isolated, one-shot encounters are encouraging—keeping
at bay a “nasty, brutish, and short” Hobbesian existence. Across the four
countries studied, in the direct-reciprocity condition, 55 of 56 senders
demonstrate trust and sent money to the responders. In 71% of those
cases, the senders’ trust was positively reciprocated by the responders.
That is, in the direct-reciprocity condition, 71% of senders ended up better
off (wealthier) than when they had begun, as a result of their trust and
their partner’s reciprocation.
Although the value produced by exchange decreased as the context of
exchange moved from the dyad to group to strangers, our results show
that even in the most socially distant indirect exchange condition, actors
could still benefit from individuals’ trust. In the strangers condition, 101
of 112 senders were trusting, and 23% of senders benefited from that trust
and were reciprocated with more than they had sent. These results show
that people will trust and reciprocate to benefit even anonymous strangers,
and as a result, a significant portion of society ends up better off than
they were.
REFERENCES
Axelrod, R. 1984. The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books.
Baron, Reuben M., and David A. Kenny. 1986. “The Moderator-Mediator Variable
Distinction in Social Psychological Research: Conceptual, Strategic, and Statistical
Considerations.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 51:1173–82.
Bearman, Peter. 1997. “Generalized Exchange.” American Journal of Sociology 102:
1383–1415.
Berg, Joyce, John Dickhaut, and Kevin McCabe. 1995. “Trust, Reciprocity, and Social
History.” Games and Economic Behavior 10:122–42.
Bond, Michael Harris, and Kwang-kuo Hwang. 1995. “The Social Psychology of the
Chinese People.” Pp. 213–66 in The Psychology of the Chinese People, edited by
Michael Harris Bond. Hong Kong: Oxford University Press.
Brewer, Marilynn. 1979. “In-group Bias in the Minimal Intergroup Situation: A
Cognitive Motivational Analysis.” Psychological Bulletin 86:307–24.
———. 1981. “Ethnocentricism and Its Role in Interpersonal Trust.” Pp. 345–60 in
Scientific Inquiry and the Social Sciences, edited by M. Brewer and B. Collins. San
Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Coleman, James. 1990. Foundations of Social Theory. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press.
Trust and Reciprocity
203
Crosen, Rachel T. A. 1996. “Information in Ultimatum Games: An Experimental
Study.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 30:197–212.
Dawes, Robyn M. 1980. “Social Dilemmas.” Annual Review of Psychology 31:169–93.
Dawes, Robyn M., Jeanne McTavish, and Harriet Shaklee. 1977. “Behavior,
Communication, and Assumptions about Other People’s Behavior in a Commons
Dilemma Situation.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 35:1–11.
Deutsch, Morton. 1962. “Cooperation and Trust: Some Theoretical Notes.” Pp. 275–318
in Nebraska Symposium on Motivation, edited by M. Jones. Lincoln: University of
Nebraska Press.
———. 2000. “Cooperation and Competition.” Pp. 21–40 in The Handbook of Conflict
Resolution, edited by M. Deutsch and P. T. Coleman. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Ellison, Glenn. 1993. “Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination.” Econometrica
61:1047–71.
Emerson, Richard. 1962. “Power-Dependence Relations.” American Sociological
Review 27:31–41.
———. 1964. “Power-Dependence Relations: Two Experiments.” Sociometry 27:
282–98.
———. 1981. “Social Exchange Theory.” Pp. 30–65 in Social Psychology: Sociological
Perspectives, edited by M. Rosenberg and R. H. Turner. New York: Basic Books.
Emerson, Richard, and Karen S. Cook. 1978. “Power, Equity and Commitment in
Exchange Networks.” American Sociological Review 43:721–39.
Fehr, Ernst, S. Gachter, and G. Kirchsteiger. 1997. “Reciprocity as a Contract
Enforcement Device: Experimental Evidence.” Econometrica 65:833–60.
Fishman, Raymond, and Tarun Khana. 1999. “Is Trust a Historical Residue?
Information Flows and Trust Levels.” Journal of Economic Behavior and
Organization 38:79–92.
Forsythe, Robert, Joel L. Horowitz, N. E. Savin, and Martin Sefton. 1994. “Fairness
in Simple Bargaining Experiments.” Games and Economic Behavior 6:347–69.
Frank R. H. 1988. Passions within Reason. New York: Norton.
Fukuyama, Francis. 1995. Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity.
New York: Free Press.
Gambetta, Diego. 1988. “Can We Trust in Trust?” Pp. 213–37 in Trust: Making and
Breaking Cooperative Relations, edited by D. Gambetta. New York: Blackwell.
Granovetter, Mark. 1973. “The Strength of Weak Ties.” American Journal of Sociology
78:1360–80.
Greenspan, Alan. 1999. Harvard University Commencement Address.
Hagen, James M., and Soonkyoo Choe. 1998. “Trust in Japanese Interfirm Relations:
Institutional Sanctions Matter.” Academy of Management Review 23:589–600.
Hardin, G. 1968. “The Tragedy of Commons.” Science 162:1243–48.
Hayashi, Nahoko, Elinor Ostrom, James Walker, and Toshio Yamagishi. 1999.
“Reciprocity, Trust, and the Sense of Control.” Rationality and Society 11:27–46.
Hechter, Michael. 1987. Principles of Group Solidarity. Berkeley and Los Angeles:
University of California Press.
Hoffman, Elizabeth, Kevin McCabe, and Vernon L. Smith. 1996. “Social Distance and
Other-Regarding Behavior in Dictator Games.” American Economic Review 86:
653–60.
Hofstede, Geert. 1980. Culture’s Consequences. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage.
Inglehart, Ronald, Miguel Basa´n˜ez, and Alejandro Moreno. 1998a. Human Values and
Beliefs: A Cross Cultural Sourcebook. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
———. 1998b. World Values Survey. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Kachelmeier, Steven J., and Mohamed Shehata. 1992. “Culture and Competition: A
Laboratory Market Comparison Between China and the West.” Journal of Economic
Behavior and Organization 14:145–68.
Kagel, John, Chung Kim, and Donald Moser. 1996. “Fairness in Ultimatum Games
American Journal of Sociology
204
with Asymmetric Information and Asymmetric Payoffs.” Games and Economic
Behavior 13:100–110.
Knack, Stephen, and Philip Keefer. 1997. “Does Social Capital Have An Economic
Payoff? A Cross-Country Investigation.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 1250–88.
Kollock, Peter. 1993. “ ‘An Eye for an Eye Leaves Everyone Blind’: Cooperation and
Accounting Systems.” American Sociological Review 58:768–86.
———. 1994. “The Emergence of Exchange Structures: An Experimental Study of
Uncertainty, Commitment, and Trust.” American Journal of Sociology 100:313–45.
La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Salanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny.
1997. “Trust in Large Organizations.” American Economic Review Papers and
Proceedings 87:333–38.
Lawler, Edward J., Shane Thye, and Jeongkoo Yoon. 2000. “Emotion and Group
Cohesion in Productive Exchange.” American Journal of Sociology 106:616–57.
Macy, Michael W. 1997. “Identity, Interest and Emergent Rationality.” Rationality and
Society 9:427–48.
Macy, Michael W., and John Skvoretz. 1998. “The Evolution of Trust and Cooperation
between Strangers: A Computational Model.” American Sociological Review 63:
638–60.
Messick, David, and Marilynn Brewer. 1983. “Solving Social Dilemmas: A Review.”
Pp. 11–44 in Review of Personality and Social Psychology, edited by L. Wheeler.
Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage.
Messick, David, and Diane Mackie. 1989. “Intergroup Relations.” Annual Review of
Psychology 40:45–81.
Molm, Linda D. 1988. “The Structure and Use of Power: A Comparison of Reward
and Punishment Power.” Social Psychology Quarterly 51:108–22.
Molm, Linda D., and Karen S. Cook. 1995. “Social Exchange and Exchange Networks.”
Pp. 209–35 in Sociological Perspectives on Social Psychology, edited by K. Cook,
G. Fine, and J. S. House. Boston: Allyn & Bacon.
Nowak, Martin A., and Karl Sigmund. 2000. “Shrewd Investments.” Science 288:
819–20.
Orbell, John, and Robyn M. Dawes. 1991. “A ‘Cognitive Miser’ Theory of Cooperators’
Advantage.” American Political Science Review 85:515–28.
Orbell, John, Alphons van de Kragt, and Robyn M. Dawes. 1988. “Explaining
Discussion-Induced Cooperation.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 54
(5): 811–19.
Orbell, John, Langche Zeng, and Matthew Mulford. 1996. “Individual Experience and
the Fragmentation of Societies.” American Sociological Review 61:1018–32.
Ouchi, William. 1981. Theory 2. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley.
Oyserman, Daphna, Heather M. Coon, and Marcud Kemmelmeier. 2002. “Rethinking
Individualism and Collectivism: Evaluation of Theoretical Assumptions and Meta-
Analyses.” Psychological Bulletin 128:3–72.
Platt, John. 1973. “Social Traps.” American Psychologist 28:641–51.
Probst, Tahira, Peter J. Carnevale, and Harry C. Triandis. 1999. “Cultural Values in
Intergroup and Single-Group Social Dilemmas.” Organizational Behavior and
Human Decision Processes. 77:171–91.
Putnam, Robert D. 1993. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy.
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
Rabin, Matthew. 1993. “Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics.”
American Economic Review 5:1281–1302.
Roth, Alvin, Vesna Prasnikar, Masahiro Okuno-fujiwara, and Shmuel Zamir. 1991.
“Bargaining and Market Behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and Tokyo:
An Experimental Study.” American Economic Review 81:1068–95.
Sabel, Charles F. 1993. “Studied Trust: Building New Forms of Cooperation in a
Trust and Reciprocity
205
Volatile Economy.” Pp. 104–44 in Explorations in Economic Sociology, edited by
R. Swedberg. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
Sen, Amartya 1967. “Isolation, Assurance and the Social Rate of Discount” Quarterly
Journal of Economics 82:112–24.
Singelis, T. M., Harry C. Triandis, D. P. S. Bhawuk, and M. Gelfand. 1995. “Horizontal
and Vertical Dimensions of Individualism and Collectivism: A Theoretical and
Measurement Refinement.” Cross-Cultural Research 29:240–75.
Snijders, Chris, and Gideon Keren. 1999. “Determinants of Trust.” Pp. 355–86 in Games
and Human Behavior, edited by D. Budescu, I. Erev, and R. Zwick. Mahwah, N.J.:
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
———. 2001. “Do You Trust? Whom You Trust? When Do You Trust?” Pp. 129–60
in Advances in Group Processes, edited by S. Thye, E. Lawler, M. Macy, and H.
Walker. New York: Elsevier Science.
Tajfel, Henri, M. Billing, R. Bundy, and C. Flament. 1971. “Social Categorization in
Intergroup Behavior.” European Journal of Social Psychology 1:149–78.
Tajfel, Henri, and John Turner. 1979. “An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict.”
Pp. 94–109 in The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations, edited by W. Austin
and S. Worchel. Monterey, Calif.: Brooks/Cole Publishers.
Takahashi, Nobuyuki. 2000. “The Emergence of Generalized Exchange.” American
Journal of Sociology 105:1105–34.
Triandis, Harry C. 1995. Individualism & Collectivism. Boulder, Colo.: Westview.
Triandis, Harry C., Robert Bontempo, Mracelo J. Villareal, Masaaki Asai, and Nydia
Lucca. 1988. “Individualism and Collectivism: Cross-Cultural perspectives on Self-
Ingroup Relations.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 54:323–38.
Triandis, Harry C., and M. Gelfand. 1998. “Convergent Measurement of Horizontal
and Vertical Individualism and Collectivism. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology 74:118–28.
Tyler, Tom, and Robyn M. Dawes. 1993. “Fairness in Groups: Comparing the Self-
Interest and Social Identity Perspectives.” Pp. 87–108 in Psychological Perspectives
on Justice, edited by Barbara Mellers and Jonathan Baron. New York: Cambridge
University Press.
U.S. Department of Labor. 1998. Monthly Labor Review. Bureau of Labor Statistics,
43–52.
Williamson, Oliver E. 1993. “Calculativeness, Trust and Economic Organization.”
Journal of Law and Economics 30:131–45.
Yamagishi, Toshio. 1988a. “Exit from the Group as an Individualistic Solution to the
Public Good Problem in the United States and Japan.” Journal of Experimental
Social Psychology 24:530–42.
———. 1988b. “The Provision of a Sanctioning System in the United States and Japan.”
Social Psychology Quarterly 51:265–71.
———. 1995. “Social Dilemmas.” Pp. 311–35 in Sociological Perspectives on Social
Psychology, edited by K. S. Cook, G. A. Fine, and J. S. House. Boston: Allyn &
Bacon.
Yamagishi, Toshio, and Karen S. Cook. 1993. “Generalized Exchange and Social
Dilemmas.” Social Psychology Quarterly 56:235–48.
Yamagishi, Toshio, Karen S. Cook, and Motoki Watabe. 1998. “Uncertainty, Trust,
and Commitment Formation in the United States and Japan.” American Journal of
Sociology 104:165–94.
Yamagishi, Toshio, Nobuhito Jin, and Toko Kiyonari. 1999. “Bounded Generalized
Reciprocity: In-Group Boasting and Ingroup Favoritism.” Pp. 161–97 in Advances
in Group Processes, edited by S. Thye, M. Macy, H. Walker, and E. Lawler. New
York: Elsevier Science.
Yamagishi, Toshio, and M. Yamagishi. 1994. “Trust and Commitment in the United
States and Japan.” Motivation and Emotion 18:9–66.
American Journal of Sociology
206
Zand, D. E. 1972. “Trust and Managerial Problem Solving.” Administrative Science
Quarterly 17:229–39.
Ziller, R. C. 1965. “Toward a Theory of Open and Closed Groups.” Psychological
Bulletin 64:164–82.
